Over the past decade, Egypt has witnessed a significant expansion in road, bridge, and transportation infrastructure projects—most notably the National Roads Project, which the government presents as one of its flagship achievements. This article seeks to critically examine the prevailing narrative surrounding the effectiveness of these projects by tracing the scale of public spending and borrowing directed toward the sector, and comparing it with their tangible outcomes on the ground.

The article seeks to raise a central question: do these projects effectively address urban and transportation challenges, or do they reproduce them in a more costly form? It also examines the extent to which a lack of integration between transport policies and urban planning contributes to the persistence of population density, rising living costs, and increasing financial burdens—thereby prompting broader questions about development priorities and the limits of their effectiveness in improving citizens’ quality of life.

The National Roads Project

The National Roads Project is among the largest infrastructure initiatives implemented in Egypt in recent years. It included plans to construct approximately 7,000 kilometers of new roads, of which nearly 6,500 kilometers have been completed, in addition to upgrading and rehabilitating around 10,000 kilometers of the existing road network, at a total cost exceeding EGP 300 billion. The project also encompassed the construction of dozens of transverse axes across the Nile, as well as the expansion of nearly 1,000 bridges and tunnels.

According to official government statements, the National Roads Project aims to reduce traffic intersections and improve traffic flow. The expansion has not been limited to highways; it has also extended to the development of thousands of kilometers of local roads within governorates, linking them to various development projects. These figures reflect an unprecedented expansion of the road network in terms of length, cost, and the number of implemented projects, making this sector one of the largest recipients of infrastructure investment in recent years.

Expropriation for Transport and Road Projects

According to the periodic report issued by Diwan Alomran on expropriation cases, the Egyptian government expropriated approximately 2.6 million square meters (equivalent to 492 feddans) of privately owned land in 2025, affecting around 2,469 citizens. The transport, roads, and bridges sectors accounted for roughly 60% of the total expropriated area and affected individuals, with more than 1.23 million square meters taken and approximately 1,981 people impacted.

In the roads and bridges sector, the expropriated area reached approximately 1,064,399 square meters (equivalent to about 253.4 feddans), affecting around 1,690 individuals. These projects included the construction and development of major traffic corridors, the expansion of existing roads, the construction of overpasses, and the integration of new axes with national and international highway networks, in addition to upgrades to the Ring Road, regional connectivity corridors, and coastal roads, as well as projects implemented within existing urban areas.

In the transport sector, the expropriated area amounted to approximately 171,830 square meters (around 40.9 feddans), affecting 291 individuals. These projects varied across metro systems, railways, rapid transit, ports, bus rapid transit (BRT) stations, electric railways, and regional transport lines.

The Transport Sector and External Public Debt

Questions arise regarding how transport projects in Egypt are financed, particularly in light of the country’s rising external public debt, which reached approximately USD 163.7 billion as of September 2025. The Ministry of Transport is among the government entities contributing to this debt. According to statements by Minister of Transport Kamel Al-Wazir, the total loans obtained by the ministry amount to around USD 20 billion, representing approximately 12.2% of Egypt’s total external debt.

However, during the same appearance on the television program “El Hekaya” in March 2026, the minister denied that the ministry relies on loans to finance road and port projects, stating:

“We do not spend a single cent on roads, and anyone who can prove that I have taken a loan to build a road or a port will be refunded.

In contrast, Matsadaksh, a fact-checking platform, presented a set of official data indicating that the Ministry of Transport has obtained external financing for projects related to roads and ports—contradicting the minister’s statements. The ministry secured several loans from the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development between 2018 and 2022 to finance road projects in Sinai, totaling approximately KWD 128.5 million (equivalent to around USD 420 million).

In addition, other financing agreements were concluded for transport infrastructure projects, with the total value of loan agreements signed by Egypt’s transport sector between 2020 and 2023 reaching approximately USD 7.28 billion.

In early 2026, Egypt’s parliament approved a loan of approximately USD 332 million to complete the third phase of the Light Rail Transit (LRT) project, which connects the New Administrative Capital to 10th of Ramadan City over a distance of 20.4 kilometers.

In March 2025, the National Authority for Tunnels announced that it had secured a loan worth EGP 5 billion from a consortium of local banks to complete the monorail projects serving the New Administrative Capital and 6th of October City. This followed a previous loan agreement signed in 2021 amounting to EUR 1.88 billion for the same projects.

These large-scale projects undertaken by the Egyptian government—across both the transport sector and road and bridge infrastructure—and which are still ongoing, have had direct implications on two fundamental dimensions affecting citizens’ lives and rights.

The first is the social dimension, as approximately 1,981 citizens lost their private property as a result of expropriation decisions. The second is the economic dimension, with transport projects in particular contributing billions of dollars to the country’s external debt burden.

Accordingly, it would be reasonable to expect that these social and economic costs are reflected positively in citizens’ lives, and that they contribute to addressing the shortcomings of the transport sector. This raises a fundamental question as to whether such returns have actually been realized—an issue that the following analysis seeks to unpack and assess.

Road Accidents

The first axis of analysis in this article examines how the social and economic costs are reflected in the quality and safety of roads, and consequently in the reduction of risks associated with traffic accidents.

According to periodic reports issued by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), the number of injuries resulting from road accidents has increased significantly between 2014 and 2024. Injuries rose from 22,717 cases in 2014 to 76,362 cases in 2024—an increase of 53,645 cases, representing a rise of approximately 236.2%. This reflects a substantial escalation in the scale of road accident-related injuries over this period.

As for fatalities, the number declined from 5,504 cases in 2014 to 5,260 in 2024—a decrease of 244 cases, representing a reduction of approximately 4.4%. However, when compared to the scale of spending and the magnitude of the projects implemented, this decline remains limited and does not appear proportionate to the level of investment.

The Ring Road—one of Egypt’s major infrastructure projects, with its expansion costing approximately EGP 50 billion according to remarks by the Minister of Transport—has not seen an end to accidents. The road has witnessed several fatal incidents following its expansion at different points in time. Among them was a collision involving seven vehicles in the direction of El-Moneeb, above the Ezbet Khairallah area, resulting in one fatality and around 15 injuries.

Transport Fares

The second axis of analysis focuses on the premise that one of the stated objectives of developing new traffic corridors in Egypt is to reduce travel distances and journey times between different areas. This, in turn, is expected to be reflected in transportation costs—either by lowering fares or at least limiting their increase, even amid rising fuel prices—given the shorter distances traveled by vehicles.

In reality, the opposite appears to be the case. In recent years, transport fares have increased noticeably across both private and public modes of transportation. The expansion of road infrastructure has not only failed to reduce transportation costs, but in some cases has even served as a direct justification for their increase.

For example, the Benha Expressway, inaugurated in 2017 as part of the National Roads Project and extending over 40 kilometers, had adverse economic implications for its users. According to Ahmed Abdel-Qawy, who works in Cairo and travels weekly to his family in El-Mahalla El-Kubra using shared taxis (microbuses), drivers began offering passengers a choice before the journey: either take the old road and endure congestion, or pay an additional EGP 5 to use the new road.

This trend is not limited to road-based transport, but also extends to organized mass transit systems, most notably the metro. Since 2017, ticket prices have been rising after remaining fixed for many years at one Egyptian pound. Fares were first increased to EGP 2, followed by successive hikes with the introduction of a distance-based fare system, ultimately reaching a maximum of EGP 20 by 2026.

Accordingly, the cost of a full journey has risen from just EGP 1 before 2017—regardless of the number of stations—to EGP 20 for the same trip today, representing an increase of approximately 1900%. This indicates that reducing travel distances and improving infrastructure efficiency have not translated into lower transportation costs; rather, they have been associated with continuous price increases across both public and mass transit systems.

Based on the above data, it can be concluded that the new projects have not served as a positive factor in reducing public transport fares amid rising fuel prices. On the contrary, they have, in some cases, become a contributing factor to increasing the overall cost of travel.

Urban Planning and Population Density

The third axis of analysis examines the broader objective: is the construction and expansion of roads, along with the provision of modern transport systems, an end in itself, or merely a means to achieving a larger and more complex goal?

The Greater Cairo Region faces a persistent challenge of high population density, driven by administrative centralization and the concentration of government services within it, alongside the limited success of new cities in attracting residents away from the capital. According to the Urban Observatory, the population of new cities affiliated with the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) accounted for only 1.7% of Egypt’s total population in 2024.

From this perspective, the transport sector is expected to function as a tool for urban development, contributing to the redistribution of population and economic activities, and facilitating movement toward more suitable new areas. This aligns with the stated objectives of the National Roads Project. Accordingly, transport projects should have been directed to serve this goal by linking them with housing developments and providing efficient routes connecting new residential areas with centers of employment and services.

Conversely, when such integration is absent, and road and bridge projects are primarily focused on expanding existing networks or constructing new corridors within the current urban fabric—aimed solely at reducing travel times without addressing the root causes of urban congestion—the result is the persistence, or even intensification, of population density, along with continued pressure on the Greater Cairo Region.

Population data for the Greater Cairo Region between 2020 and 2025 show a clear and continuous increase in population density. The population of Cairo Governorate rose from approximately 9.9 million in 2020 to over 10.4 million in 2025. Similarly, Giza’s population increased from about 9.1 million to 9.75 million over the same period, while Qalyubia also recorded growth from around 5.9 million to more than 6.2 million.

As a result, the total population of the region increased by approximately 1.45 million people over just five years—within existing urban areas rather than new urban communities—according to data from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS).

The above data reflect the continued population pressure on the region despite the significant expansion in road and transport projects, raising questions about the extent to which these initiatives have succeeded in achieving one of their stated objectives—namely, redistributing the population beyond the existing urban core.

These figures suggest that the region’s population attractiveness remains high, and that transport policies have not brought about a fundamental shift in patterns of urban concentration. This reinforces the argument that improving transport infrastructure, in the absence of an integrated planning vision, may contribute to reinforcing density rather than alleviating it.

Conclusion

Transport projects are not an end in themselves, and their expansion does not necessarily resolve congestion; in fact, it may increase demand for their use. In such cases, these projects shift from being tools of strategic planning to merely mechanisms for managing, rather than solving, the crisis.

This underscores the need to rethink the trajectory of urban development in Egypt, ensuring that it is not reduced to road expansion alone, but instead rearticulated within a comprehensive vision aimed at redistributing the population and achieving a genuine balance between costs and benefits—rather than continuing to manage the crisis without resolving it.