State lands and properties were subjected to blatant and serious violations under previous regimes, carried out in violation of the law and constitution, with the assistance of former officials who profited from allocating these lands. The looted land area reached [1], as during the thirty years of Mubarak’s rule and the dominance of the National Democratic Party—marked by various forms of corruption—state lands were not spared from theft and the facilitation of their seizure by businessmen and investors supporting the ruling party, prominent leaders within it, or state officials. In this report, we attempt to highlight some of the most well-known cases that have recently come to public attention.
Former Minister of Housing, Mohamed Ibrahim Suleiman, submitted documents to the Public Funds Prosecution proving that his predecessor, Hasaballah El Kafrawi, allocated 79 villas to the Bin Laden Group in Marina Island, covering an area of 100,000 square meters, along with an additional 80,000 square meters on the seafront and 10,000 square meters for Arab princes.[2]
Madinaty Project
In August 2005, a contract was signed between the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) and Talaat Moustafa Group, owned by businessman Hisham Talaat Moustafa, for the purchase of approximately 5,000 feddans, with the agreement that the state would receive 7% of the units built by the company.[3]
On July 22, 2010, the Administrative Court of Cairo ruled to annul the sale contract of Madinaty land, which had been sold at a price of 200 EGP per square meter, including infrastructure costs.[4]
On November 24, 2011, Al-Shorouk newspaper published the reasoning behind the Administrative Court’s ruling confirming the validity of the new contract for selling the Madinaty land, signed on November 18, 2010, between NUCA and Talaat Moustafa Group.[5]
The court stated that it was fully convinced of the necessity of reselling the land directly to the company after the Supreme Administrative Court had ruled the previous 2006 contract void. This decision was justified by the need to address social and economic considerations in the public interest, as stipulated in Article 31 (repeated) of the Public Tenders and Auctions Law.
The court upheld the findings of the legal committee formed by former Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif to study the implementation of the annulment ruling while preserving the rights of property buyers, the 63,000 shareholders of the company, and the 150,000 residents and workers in the project. It also aimed to secure expected investments worth 60 billion EGP.
The court further noted that “honest businessmen” suggested during a meeting with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces on August 14 that land allocation contracts should be respected and not invalidated, as this would negatively impact both current and future investments.
Additionally, the court emphasized the need to reconsider the laws and regulations governing NUCA to align with its original purpose—developing urban communities through national plans that meet the country’s needs—rather than functioning as a mere land trader, which has led to a flood of contract nullification lawsuits.
Regarding the agreement for the state to receive 7% of the residential units as in-kind compensation, the court referenced the Public Prosecution’s memorandum in Case No. 200/2010, which accused former Minister of Housing Ibrahim Suleiman of accepting bribes in exchange for allocating the project land to businessman Hisham Talaat Moustafa.
It was revealed that the company initially offered to pay in cash, but Suleiman rejected the proposal after consulting expert committees, including representatives from the Administrative Control Authority and the State Council. Their findings concluded that a cash transaction would not benefit NUCA as much as an in-kind deal, which would secure greater value. The precedent of in-kind transactions in past deals further justified this approach.
However, the court expressed concerns over the reassessment of the land price by the Government Services Authority’s High Evaluation Committee, which revalued it at 297 EGP per square meter for 44 million square meters. This was despite the Finance Minister justifying the price by referencing a 2004 land allocation to Arab Contractors at 42 EGP per square meter and an Ain Shams University Urban Planning Department assessment valuing similar land along the Third Ring Road at 200-250 EGP per square meter.
The court pointed out that land in the DAMAC project had been priced at 750 EGP per square meter and that the evaluation committee should have distinguished between already developed and contracted areas and those that remained unreserved. While maintaining the original price for pre-sold units to protect good-faith buyers, the price for unreserved land should have been reassessed, as its value had significantly increased since the annulled contract was signed. The failure to adjust these prices resulted in a severe imbalance in the contract’s financial terms, necessitating a re-evaluation to ensure fairness for both parties.[6]
Palm Hills Case
Following the January Revolution, the case of “Palm Hills” was reopened. The company’s shares were partially owned by former Minister of Housing, “Ahmed El-Maghrabi,” while his cousin, “Yassin Mansour”—brother of former Minister of Transport “Mohamed Mansour”—chaired its board of directors. In 2006, El-Maghrabi allocated approximately 84 million square meters to his company at a price of 250 EGP per square meter, while the actual price at the time was 650 EGP per square meter. Investigations revealed that the value of the land illegally acquired by the minister and his cousin, Yassin Mansour, over just five years exceeded 100 billion EGP.[7]
On April 26, 2011, lawyers from the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights obtained a ruling invalidating the contract for Palm Hills in New Cairo. The Administrative Court (Eighth Circuit for Contracts) ruled that the contract was void due to its violation of public bidding and procurement laws.[8]
Cairo Festival City
The crisis surrounding “Cairo Festival City” dates back to 1997 when the Egyptian government allocated 700 feddans in New Cairo to the Emirati “Al-Futtaim Group” for the establishment of the “Cairo Festival City” project, valued at 3.2 billion EGP—an amount significantly lower than the rental value of the land at the time.
The contract was amended in 2007, and the company paid additional sums. However, regulatory reports indicated violations related to the discrepancy between the allocated price and the actual market value of the land. In late November 2014, Al-Futtaim Real Estate Group announced that it had reached a final settlement regarding its land in New Cairo with then-Prime Minister Ibrahim Mahlab. The settlement included amending the land sale contract, requiring Al-Futtaim Group to pay 218 million EGP to the New Urban Communities Authority in a lump sum, including 86 million EGP for three old installments owed by the group. This came after the company had previously offered to pay a much higher sum of up to 5 billion EGP.[9]
Metro Global Company
In its report on land allocation to “Metro Global” (Makro Cash & Carry), the Administrative Control Authority stated that the company submitted a request to the former governor of Cairo for approval to purchase a 30,000 square meter plot of land in Al-Salam City. The governor approved the valuation committee’s decision, which initially set the price at 3,300 EGP per square meter. The company then appealed the price, leading to a reduction to 1,750 EGP per square meter.
The governor approved the land transfer procedures and issued a decision to allocate a 30,655 square meter plot in Om Elak 3 Station, next to the Al-Salam district building, to establish a wholesale market at the reduced price of 1,750 EGP per square meter. The report confirmed that the land was sold directly to “Metro Global” without a public auction, violating Articles 30 and 31 (revised) of the Public Bidding and Procurement Law.
Land Allocation: The Problem and the Solution
Before 2010, successive Mubarak governments relied on businessmen as a key force in economic development. Many of these businessmen were also government officials and members of the ruling National Democratic Party. As a result, they facilitated land allocations for their own companies or secret partners at extremely low prices—sometimes as little as 0.5 EGP per square meter—for large-scale residential and commercial projects.
Corruption in land allocation became more apparent after the January 2011 Revolution, bringing many cases to light. This section presents some of these cases and their current legal status.
The root of land allocation corruption lay in the lack of coordination among multiple ministries managing state-owned lands. Each ministry independently determined its land needs, often exaggerating the required area. Some ministries even claimed vast areas for projects that exceeded their actual needs. For example, the Red Sea coast was allocated to the Ministry of Tourism, which established temporary tourism projects without permanent settlements. Meanwhile, the Mediterranean coast was assigned to the Ministry of Housing, leading to seasonal housing developments without tourism activities.
Some entities also sought to change the designated land use to serve private interests or sell the land at public auctions, depositing the proceeds into special employee funds. Additionally, some ministries and authorities provided allocated land to investors for private projects, effectively transferring public property into private hands. Companies also frequently changed the use of land originally designated for agricultural development into luxury residential resorts, which generated higher profits. In many cases, allocated land was excessively large, with significant portions left undeveloped due to budget and investment constraints.[10]
In 2005 and 2006, two studies were conducted to address these issues:
- “State Management of Desert and Coastal Land Resources in New Development Axes Outside the Urban Boundaries,” issued by the National Specialized Councils, which proposed a land allocation policy based on three principles:
- Achieving comprehensive national development goals
- Preventing speculation
- Ensuring that the state retains land ownership
- “Public Land Management Strategy in Egypt,” commissioned by the World Bank and the Ministry of Investment, which aimed to regulate land allocation and make land available for investment.
The study proposed three institutional reforms:
- Establishing the Supreme Council for Urban Planning and State Land Management, responsible for overseeing state-owned land, setting policies, and approving land allocations.
- Assigning a single authority, preferably the Ministry of Finance, to manage all state-owned land, replacing the current fragmented system.
- Enacting a unified land law to replace the existing scattered regulations and ensure transparency in land management.[11]
Conclusion: Land Allocation in the Mubarak Era
Land allocation during the Mubarak era was not just another corruption scandal—it was a clear example of deep-rooted governance failures and the lack of institutional oversight. The absence of coordination among responsible ministries created opportunities for officials and businessmen to exploit public lands for personal gain. These practices turned state-owned land—meant for national development—into a tool for personal enrichment at the expense of the public interest.
At the time, urgent reforms were needed to restructure land management and ensure transparency and fairness in land pricing and allocation. The proposed Supreme Council for Urban Planning and State Land Management was a strategic step toward preventing further abuses and redirecting land allocation toward comprehensive development rather than private interests.
Additionally, consolidating land management under a single authority would have improved resource allocation, preventing the misuse of public assets. A transparent, modern land law with strict oversight mechanisms would have been essential in preventing such corruption from recurring.
Had these reforms been implemented, they could have restored public trust in government institutions and reaffirmed that national resources belong to the people and future generations, rather than serving as a wealth-generation tool for a privileged few.
References
[1] كريم ربيع، تقرير| «الأراضي المنهوبة» تقدر بـ 16 مليون فدان وقيمتها تصل لـ 900 مليار، موقع التحرير، 9 ديسمبر 2015.
[2] سيد محفوظ، المصرية الكويتية لأراضى العياط باعت أراضى لمستثمرين بـ 800 مليون جنيه، اليوم السابع، 6 ابريل 2011.
[3] سجن وزير مصري سابق “أهدر” 37 مليار جنيه، سكاي نيوز عربية، 9 فبراير 2017، اخر اطلاع 11 مارس 2018.
[4] محمود سعد الدين، هشام طلعت مصطفى يحاول إخفاء فضيحة أرض «مدينتي»، اليوم السابع، الجمعة، 02 أبريل 2010.
[5] المصدر السابق.
[6] نور على، اليوم السابع يعيد نشر النص الكامل لعقد مدينتي، 22 يونيو 2010.
[7] عبد الوهاب ربيع، أراضي الدولة. تاريخ من السرقة على عين الدولة، التحرير، 14 مايو 2017.
[8] محمد بصل، (الشروق) تنشر حيثيات الحكم بصحة عقد (مدينتي) الجديد، 24 نوفمبر 2011.
[9] نص الحكم الخاص ببطلان عقد مدينتي، المركز المصري للحقوق الاقتصادية والاجتماعية، 6 يوليو، 2010
حكم بطلان عقد أرض مدينتي، 24 سبتمبر، 2010، المركز المصري للحقوق الاقتصادية والاجتماعية.
[10] محمد فوزي، أحمد المغربي… لعنة «بالم هيلز»، الاخبار، 10 يوليو 2011.
[11] الحكم ببطلان عقد بالم هيلز وإعادة قضية توشكي للمرافعة وتأجيل باقي قضايا الأراضي لتقديم مستندات، المركز المصري للحقوق الاقتصادية والاجتماعية، 26 أبريل، 2011.
[12] عبد الوهاب ربيع، أراضي الدولة. تاريخ من السرقة على عين الدولة، التحرير، 14 مايو 2017، اخر اطلاع 10 يوليو 2017.
[13] أبو زيد راجح، أرض مصر في مهب الريح، مؤتمر شركاء التنمية للبحوث والاستشارات والتدريب (PID)، الشفافية في تخصيص أملاك الدولة في مصر، القاهرة 4 ابريل 2011.
[14] مؤتمر شركاء التنمية للبحوث والاستشارات والتدريب (PID)، الشفافية في تخصيص أملاك الدولة في مصر، القاهرة 4 ابريل 2011.
